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I. INTRODUCTION 
A publicly traded corporation wishes to spend funds to publicize its 
views against a proposed constitutional amendment imposing a graduated 
personal income tax.1 The majority of the company’s board of directors 
believes that the proposed amendment would adversely affect earnings 
by shrinking the disposable income of individuals available for the 
purchase of the company’s products. Silencing the corporation’s intended 
speech is a criminal statute prohibiting corporations from making 
expenditures designed to influence the vote on any question submitted to 
voters by referendum. The company files suit, seeking to have the statute 
declared unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The result, though 
controversial, is hardly unexpected. Citing Citizens United v. FEC, the 
                                                                                                                       
 * Chief Managing Editor, Ohio State Law Journal; J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State 
University Moritz College of Law, expected 2013; B.B.A., Accountancy and French, 
University of Notre Dame, 2010. 
 1 This hypothetical is based on First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
776 (1978) (striking down a state-law prohibition on corporate independent expenditures 
related to referenda issues). 
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court strikes down the statute because it impermissibly “suppress[es] 
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.”2  
Now imagine an internal corporate struggle over the advisability of 
opposing the same tax legislation.3 An insurgent group of shareholders 
wants to elect a new group of directors who will support the proposed 
amendment. This group believes that the current board’s predictions 
regarding reduced earnings are too shortsighted; that is, it maintains that 
a graduated rate would stimulate the state’s economy by offering tax 
relief to poor and middle-class families, leading to increased revenue in 
the long run. At this point, the group entertains its options. First, it 
considers waging a proxy contest.4 Daunted by the sheer expense of 
conducting the contested election, the group quickly decides against this 
route.5 In this regard, another path is more appealing. Acting under the 
authority of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the 
Commission) Rule 14a-11, the group obligates the company to include, 
at the company’s expense, its own nominees in the company’s proxy 
card.6 The insurgents also force the company to bear the cost of 
distributing a 500-word statement explaining why the other shareholders 
should vote for their nominees instead of the company’s nominees.7  
Furious, the company files suit, seeking to have Rule 14a-11 declared 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. This time, however, the 
company loses. The court agrees with the SEC that proxy speech is 
commercial speech, and hence subject to limited First Amendment 
protection. The economic motivation behind the speech—that is, the 
sense that the company’s opposition to the proposed amendment 
concerns not so much tax policy as its own bottom line—suddenly 
justifies a burden on the company’s freedom of expression. The 
                                                                                                                       
 2 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). In Citizens United, the Supreme Court invalidated on 
First Amendment grounds 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), which had barred independent corporate 
expenditures for electioneering communications. Id. 
 3 For the inspiration behind this hypothetical, see NICHOLAS WOLFSON, CORPORATE 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE SEC 128 (1990). 
 4 A proxy contest is a “struggle between two corporate factions to obtain the votes of 
uncommitted shareholders,” usually occurring “when a group of dissident shareholders 
mounts a battle against the corporation’s managers.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1346 (9th 
ed. 2009).  
 5 Proxy contests can cost anywhere from about $30,000 to $9 million. Marcel Kahan 
& Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1384 (2011). 
 6 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,782 
(Sept. 16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11, vacated by Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 
647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 
 7 See id. at 56,785 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11) (vacated).  
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insurgents go on to defeat the incumbents—and expend funds in the 
opposite political direction. 
Proxy access is the right of certain shareholders in publicly traded 
corporations to have their nominees to the corporate board included in 
the company’s proxy statement.8 A highly controversial issue, proxy 
access has long engendered fierce debate in the corporate governance 
realm.9 Much of the argument has revolved around whether proxy access 
is a good policy choice.10 Surprisingly, however, few commentators 
argue against proxy access on free speech grounds.11 This Note focuses 
on the neglected question: the constitutionality of proxy access under the 
First Amendment. 
In 2011, the D.C. Circuit had the opportunity to consider whether the 
SEC’s proxy access rule, Rule 14a-11, violates a corporation’s First 
Amendment rights.12 Yet, the court never reached the issue, for it struck 
down the rule on administrative law grounds.13 The D.C. Circuit’s 
decision is one of classic constitutional avoidance that follows the lead of 
the Supreme Court, which itself has managed to dodge the difficult 
question of whether, and to what extent, the First Amendment covers 
speech affected by securities regulations.14 One commentator’s colorful 
analysis perhaps best explains the Court’s hesitation: avoiding the 
question forestalls the “impending jurisprudential train wreck” between 
the commercial speech doctrine on one side and the full protection 
afforded corporate political speech in Citizens United on the other.15  
The constitutionality of proxy access is an unavoidable question. The 
SEC is committed to satisfying administrative law’s “arbitrary and 
                                                                                                                       
 8 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 5, at 1349. 
 9 Id. at 1349–50. 
 10 For a discussion of the policy arguments on both sides, see Steven M. Davidoff, The 
Heated Debate Over Proxy Access, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 2, 2010, 4:04 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/the-heated-debate-over-proxy-access/.  
 11 Professor Larry Ribstein has suggested that Citizens United calls into question the 
constitutionality of “securities law provisions constraining truthful speech,” including SEC 
Rule 14a-11. Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1019, 1053 (2011). 
 12 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 13 The D.C. Circuit held that Rule 14a-11 was “arbitrary and capricious” due to the 
SEC’s failure to adequately assess its economic effects. Id. at 1155–56. 
 14 See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003) (per curiam) (dismissing certiorari 
as “improvidently granted” in a case that might have resolved the tension between corporate 
speech and the First Amendment); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985) (resolving a 
challenge to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 on narrow statutory interpretation rather 
than First Amendment grounds). 
 15 Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional 
Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 616 (2006).  
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capricious” standard,16 and when it does, the court will have no 
alternative but to resolve the open First Amendment issue. In the unlikely 
event that the SEC decides not to go back to the drawing board, however, 
its current alternative to mandatory proxy access—shareholder access 
proposals under Rule 14a-8—remains equally problematic under the First 
Amendment.17  
While the First Amendment issue is thus unavoidable, the collision 
courts and commentators have so vividly imagined is. In the context of 
corporate proxy speech in particular, and perhaps even in the realm of 
corporate governance speech in general, applying First Amendment 
principles to the SEC’s rules produces not cacophony but harmony. As 
our hypothetical dispute illustrates, government power over internal 
proxy speech leads to government influence over the corporation’s 
external expression. If the First Amendment fully protects the latter, there 
is no principled reason why the former should be afforded less 
constitutional protection under the label of commercial speech. With this 
approach, political and commercial speech remain two separate tracks, 
and the SEC continues to regulate technical financial disclosures 
unfettered by First Amendment concerns.18 
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United, both 
Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8 violate the First Amendment. Proxy speech is 
fully protected political expression, and the SEC cannot put forth a 
compelling government interest to justify regulating it. 
                                                                                                                       
 16 See infra note 27 and accompanying text.  
 17 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (2010) (requiring management to include a shareholder-
initiated proposal in a corporation’s proxy statement whenever the proposal is a proper 
matter for consideration under the laws of the state of incorporation). A proposal is not a 
proper matter for consideration, and may be excluded, if it deals exclusively with the issuer’s 
ordinary business operations. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 215–16 (2d ed. 2006). However, a proposal in furtherance of a “significant 
social policy issue[]” cannot be excluded. Final Rule: Amendments to Rules on Shareholder 
Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40018 (May 21, 1998) [hereinafter Final Rule], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-40018.htm. 
 18 While this Note demonstrates that proxy-related speech is political expression and 
that proxy access is thus unconstitutional even under the current commercial speech 
doctrine, it concludes by arguing that the fight over proxy access may prove to be the first 
step in overturning the commercial speech doctrine altogether. See infra Part V. 
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II. INFILTRATING THE CORPORATE BALLOT: TWO POINTS OF ACCESS 
The proxy process is the primary method by which shareholders of a 
publicly traded corporation elect the board of directors.19 Incumbent 
directors typically nominate a candidate for each vacancy before the 
election, which takes place at the company’s annual meeting.20 Prior to 
the meeting, the company distributes to all shareholders a set of proxy 
materials that includes information about each nominee.21 If a 
shareholder wishes to nominate a different candidate, she may initiate a 
proxy contest by filing her own proxy statement and soliciting votes from 
her fellow shareholders.22  
The proxy access rules provide shareholders an alternative—and 
more appealing—procedure for nominating directors. Designed to 
encourage boards to be more responsive to shareholders and more 
vigilant in their oversight of companies in the wake of the recent 
financial crisis, the rules open the corporate ballot to shareholder 
nominees in two different ways.23 First, Rule 14a-11—the so-called 
“Shareholder Access Rule”—generally grants long-term shareholders 
with a significant stake in the company the power to place their own 
director candidates on the corporate ballot.24 Second, Rule 14a-8, which 
entitles shareholders to include certain proposals in the company’s proxy 
materials, permits shareholders to propose bylaw amendments 
establishing proxy access for shareholders.25 While the former mandates 
                                                                                                                       
 19 James Hamilton, D.C. Circuit Vacates SEC Proxy Access Rule as Arbitrary and 
Capricious, WOLTERS KLUWER L. & BUS. BRIEFING 1 (July 2011), 
http://news.wolterskluwerlb.com/media/SpecialReport_Proxy-Access.pdf. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION 218 (3d ed. 2009). 
 24 Specifically, shareholders must hold at least three percent of the company’s shares 
for at least three years to use Rule 14a-11. See Facilitating Shareholder Director 
Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,782–83 (Sept. 16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-11(b)(1)–(2)) (vacated). Shareholders cannot use the rule if they hold the 
company’s securities with the intent of effecting a change of control of the company. See id. 
at 56,784 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(b)(6)) (vacated). 
 25 Also known as “private ordering,” proxy access on a company-by-company basis has 
a rather turbulent history. See Francis H. Byrd, Proxy Access: Only the Beginning, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 30, 2011, 9:46 AM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/10/30/proxy-access-only-the  
beginning /#printable. In 2006, the Second Circuit first opened the door to proxy access on a 
company-by-company basis by holding that a company could not exclude, under Rule 14a-
8(i)(8), proposals to amend the company’s bylaws for the purpose of establishing a 
procedure for shareholders to nominate directors. See Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. 
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proxy access for all publicly traded corporations, the latter creates the 
possibility of proxy access on a company-by-company basis. 
In July 2011, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit vacated Rule 14a-11, holding that the SEC was “arbitrary and 
capricious” in promulgating it.26 The Court of Appeals’ opinion, 
however, is unlikely to be the last word in the shareholder access 
movement for several reasons. First, while the SEC chose not to appeal 
the decision, it remains committed to facilitating shareholder access to 
the corporate ballot.27 Given that the Commission first contemplated 
proxy access sixty years ago, and has since released several controversial 
proposals,28 it is unlikely to drop its efforts on this front now. Second, 
and more importantly, the court’s ruling concerned only one of two 
points of access to the corporate ballot. While the court temporarily 
eliminated Rule 14a-11’s blanket grant of proxy access, it left untouched 
the rule allowing shareholders to submit proposals for proxy access at 
their individual companies.29 As a result, multiple commentators have 
predicted a plethora of shareholder access proposals on a company-by-
company basis for the upcoming proxy season.30  
                                                                                                                       
Emps. v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2006). Intending to reverse this 
holding, the SEC amended Rule 14a-8 a year later to allow corporations to exclude 
shareholder proposals “relating to an election for membership on the company’s board” or 
relating to “a procedure for such nomination or election.” ALLEN, supra note 23, at 219. 
When the SEC adopted Rule 14a-11 in 2009, it reversed course and simultaneously amended 
Rule 14a-8 to prevent companies from excluding such shareholder proposals from their 
proxy statements. See Hamilton, supra note 19, at 3.  
 26 See infra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.  
 27 See Press Release, SEC, Statement by SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro on Proxy 
Access Litigation (Sept. 6, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-
179.htm (explaining that the SEC “remain[s] committed to finding a way to make it easier 
for shareholders to nominate candidates to corporate boards”).  
 28 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 5, at 1349. The predecessor to the recently vacated 
Rule 14a-11, promulgated in October 2003, solicited over 700 comment letters, more than 
any other SEC proposal in recent history. See ALLEN, supra note 23, at 218; Davidoff, supra 
note 10. 
 29 See Hamilton, supra note 19, at 3. 
 30 See, e.g., Keith Paul Bishop, The Imminent Resurrection of Rule 14a-8 and the 
Renewed Significance of State Corporate Law, CAL. CORP. & SEC. L. (Sept. 12, 2011), 
http://calcorporatelaw.com/2011/09/the-imminent-resurrection-of-rule-14a-8-and-the-
renewed-significance-of-state-corporate-law/; Broc Romanek, Proxy Access: SEC Decides 
Not to Appeal—But Does Open “Private Ordering” Floodgates, THECORPORATE 
COUNSEL.NET (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/Blog/2011/09/the-secs-
rethink-of-all-its-rules-not-a-joke.html (characterizing private ordering as a “nice boon for 
corporate lawyers” and signaling the trend toward company-by-company shareholder access 
proposals).  
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Finally, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling hardly shuts the door on proxy 
access because the panel avoided one issue altogether: the interplay 
between proxy access and a corporation’s First Amendment rights. In the 
battle of proxy access, the First Amendment is the business groups’ most 
powerful weapon—if they can only learn how to use it. 
The Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce (the 
business groups) misfired on multiple accounts. First, they briefed the 
First Amendment issue to the D.C. Circuit in a way that would allow 
proxy access to continue on a company-by-company basis. Secondly, and 
relatedly, they failed altogether to recognize a more “direct route” to the 
First Amendment, the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Citizens 
United, that justifies invalidating both Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8 on 
constitutional grounds.31 
III. THE BUSINESS GROUPS’ INCOMPLETE FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE 
The business groups contended that Rule 14a-11 violates the First 
Amendment by forcing publicly traded companies “to fund and carry 
campaign speech by third parties that is opposed by the company’s duly 
elected board of directors.”32 To support this proposition, the brief relies 
on Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,33 in which 
the Supreme Court invalidated a state regulatory order requiring a utility 
to place a third-party newsletter in its customer billing envelopes.34 
Applying strict scrutiny, the plurality concluded that the Commission’s 
access requirement improperly burdened the utility’s “right to be free 
from government restrictions that abridge its own rights in order to 
‘enhance the relative voice’ of its opponents.”35 As for Rule 14a-8, the 
business groups themselves urged the continued existence of proxy 
access on a company-by-company basis by contending that shareholder 
access proposals constitute a less restrictive means by which the 
government may achieve its purpose than a blanket rule.36  
This line of attack on the constitutionality of proxy access falls short 
for several reasons. Clearly, closing one door to proxy access while 
                                                                                                                       
 31 Larry Ribstein, The Securities Laws and the First Amendment, TRUTH ON THE 
MARKET (Dec. 28, 2010, 3:21 AM), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/12/28/the-securities-
laws-and-the-first-amendment/. 
 32 Opening Brief of Petitioners Business Roundtable & Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States at 55, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1305). 
 33 Id. at 56. 
 34 475 U.S. 1, 4, 20–21 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
 35 Id. at 14 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 & n.55 (1976)). 
 36 Opening Brief of Petitioners, supra note 32, at 58. 
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personally holding the other wide open is poor strategy. Even worse, the 
precedent on which the business groups rely distinguishes “access” to 
corporate mailings and shareholder access to corporate proxies under 
Rule 14a-8, finding that the latter passes constitutional muster.37 Thus, 
the very reasoning the business groups use to attack the constitutionality 
of mandatory proxy access reinforces the constitutional validity of 
shareholder access proposals under Rule 14a-8—the rule now serving as 
the preferred point of access to the corporate ballot after the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision.38 
Had they realized the strength of their weapon, however, the business 
groups might have aimed for an additional target. Indeed, Citizens 
United, the decision that so championed the First Amendment rights of 
corporations, justifies invalidating both Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8 on 
constitutional grounds, completely closing the corporate ballot to 
shareholder nominees. 
                                                                                                                       
 37 A footnote in the Pacific Gas plurality opinion distinguishes the “access” to 
corporate mailings involved there from Rule 14a-8 proposals by maintaining that the rule 
“govern[s] speech by a corporation to itself” and therefore “do[es] not limit the range of 
information that the corporation may contribute to the public debate.” 475 U.S. at 14 n.10. 
Responding specifically to the Business Roundtable’s comment letter challenging the 
constitutionality of the proposed rulemaking, the SEC’s final rule cites Pacific Gas for the 
proposition that Rule 14a-11 governs internal, rather than external, speech. See Facilitating 
Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,674 n.61 (Sept. 16, 2010) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11) (vacated). This Note demonstrates that this distinction 
is largely artificial given the relationship between a corporation’s internal governance 
dialogue and the speech it contributes to the external political debate. See infra notes 55–56 
and accompanying text.  
 38 The inconsistency of the business groups’ argument was not lost upon the D.C. 
Circuit. In an amicus brief filed in support of the SEC, several prominent law professors 
wrote: 
Petitioners offer no principled rationale for why the First Amendment should treat these 
two rules that require companies to include shareholder statements in proxy materials 
differently. Like Rule 14a-11, Rule 14a-8 requires a company, in certain circumstances, 
to include in its proxy statement material provided by shareholders, regardless of 
whether the company’s board or management agrees with the shareholders’ position. 
Law Professors’ Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of the SEC at 9, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 
647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1305). While the professors recognize, as this Note 
proposes, that Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8 must either rise or fall together, they summarily 
dismiss the applicability of Citizens United on this outcome. See id. at 11 (maintaining, 
almost as an afterthought, that “[r]ule 14a-11 does not regulate ‘core political speech’ so as 
to implicate the concerns identified by the [Citizens United] Court”). This Note demonstrates 
that Citizens United justifies invalidating both Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8 on First Amendment 
grounds. See infra Part IV.B. 
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CITIZENS UNITED ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF PROXY ACCESS 
At this point, a crucial objection, and one the SEC proposed in 
response to the business groups’ constitutional challenge, must be 
addressed.39 Citizens United, after all, concerned corporate speech in 
connection with elections and comment on public affairs—in short, the 
political speech that lies “at the heart of the First Amendment’s 
protection.”40 At first blush, proxy speech seems far removed from this 
sacred realm, relegated to a category of speech—commercial speech—
that the courts historically have treated less favorably.41 
The political nature of proxy-related statements, however, suggests 
that the SEC’s proxy-access rules should be subject to strict scrutiny 
under the First Amendment. Both Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8 cannot satisfy 
this standard. The SEC’s interest in regulating a corporation’s proxy 
speech—to equalize the voices producing it—fails to rise to the level of a 
compelling government interest under Citizens United. Both rules must 
thus be struck down on constitutional grounds. 
                                                                                                                       
 39 See infra note 44 and accompanying text.  
 40 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) 
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). 
 41 See Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First 
Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1187 (1988) (arguing that commercial speech “is 
located at least some distance from the core or cores of the first amendment”). While 
political speech has enjoyed longstanding protection under the First Amendment, the 
Supreme Court did not extend First Amendment protection to a corporation’s commercial 
speech until 1976. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976). Four years later, the Court set out a four-factor, intermediate 
scrutiny test for assessing the constitutionality of laws affecting commercial speech. See 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). Although 
the Court has continued to subject various restrictions on commercial speech to intermediate 
scrutiny, its recent decisions have indicated that even greater protection may be warranted 
under the First Amendment. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) 
(invaliding under “heightened judicial scrutiny” a Vermont law restricting the sale, 
disclosure, and use of pharmacy records revealing the prescribing practices of individual 
doctors); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) (“[S]everal 
Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and 
whether it should apply in particular cases.”); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999) (raising the possibility that Central Hudson should be 
replaced with a more stringent test). Given this shift toward affording commercial speech 
greater protection under the First Amendment, applying strict scrutiny to regulation of 
corporate proxy speech—speech that is inherently political in nature—is a small step. See 
infra Part IV.A.   
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A. The Applicability of Citizens United to SEC Regulation of Proxy 
Speech  
Citizens United established that under the First Amendment, “the 
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the 
speaker’s corporate identity.”42 The SEC’s proxy access rules violate this 
principle because they compel a corporation to alter the content of its 
proxy materials, which are inherently political as opposed to commercial 
communications.43 
The SEC has maintained that regulation of proxy-related statements 
does not violate the First Amendment because such communications 
constitute commercial speech,44 or speech relating “solely to the 
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”45 The commercial 
speech label, however, is entirely inappropriate for proxy speech. 
Leaving aside for the moment the issue of economic interest, consider 
first that the goal of regulating commercial speech is to ensure the 
dissemination of truthful information forming the basis of product or 
share purchase decisions.46 While the SEC can readily verify the truth or 
falsity of technical financial disclosures, which it also regulates under the 
                                                                                                                       
 42 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).  
 43 First Amendment jurisprudence does not distinguish government regulations 
suppressing fully protected speech from those compelling it. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the 
Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988) (“There is certainly some difference between 
compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the 
difference is without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees 
‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and 
what not to say.”). 
 44 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,674 n.61 
(Sept. 16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11) (vacated).  
 45 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561 (1980). This definition of commercial speech is but 
one of three that the Supreme Court has proposed. When it first extended First Amendment 
protection to commercial speech, the Court defined such expression as that “which does no 
more than propose a commercial transaction.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has also stated that commercial speech has 
three characteristics, neither one of them dispositive: (1) it is an advertisement of some form; 
(2) it refers to a specific product; and (3) the speaker has an economic motivation for the 
speech. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983). The importance 
of economic motivation as a basis for relegating certain speech to less favorable First 
Amendment status, however, may have dwindled recently. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2665 
(rejecting the argument that economically motivated speech warrants less First Amendment 
protection by reasoning that “a great deal of vital expression” may result from an economic 
motive). 
 46 Cf. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 593 (observing that “false and misleading commercial 
speech is not entitled to any First Amendment protection”); WOLFSON, supra note 3, at 122 
(“[S]ome argue that the government can more easily distinguish truth from falsity in the area 
of commercial speech than in the area of political speech.”).   
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label of commercial speech, proxy statements concern complex policy 
issues that do not lend themselves to this sort of review.47 
Equally to the point, proxy statements concern more than a simple 
commodity—corporate stock—and shareholder decisions to hold or sell 
it. As one commentator has remarked, such statements “evoke larger 
questions of corporate policy and have implications for all corporate 
stakeholders including management, shareholders, employees, and the 
community at large.”48 Our hypothetical regarding the propriety of 
supporting certain tax legislation lends credence to this observation. The 
dispute concerned more than the economic interests of the incumbent 
board, the insurgents, and other shareholders; also at stake were the 
composition of the community and the disposable income of its 
members. To permit government interference in this debate under the 
guise of commercial speech regulation discounts the wider ramifications 
of corporate decision making. 
Proxy-related statements constitute fully protected political speech 
because they concern a traditionally political process within the 
corporation that is only one step removed from the political decisions 
occurring outside of it. Proxy battles, like traditional political campaigns, 
are ultimately conflicts over control; the only difference is the subject of 
the power struggle.49 Because political contributions and expenditures are 
management decisions—that is, they are decided by a vote of the board 
of directors and not subject to a shareholder vote50—the winner of a seat 
at the corporate board gains considerable influence into political decision 
making.51 If, after Citizens United, corporations are to be “full-fledged 
participants in political debates,”52 the First Amendment must fully 
protect both their external political speech and the internal governance 
process that shapes it. 
Under the First Amendment, government attempts to regulate fully 
protected political speech are presumptively invalid unless they survive 
strict scrutiny; that is, the government must demonstrate that the 
regulation both furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to 
                                                                                                                       
 47 See WOLFSON, supra note 3, at 123.  
 48 Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and 
Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 546 (2011).  
 49 WOLFSON, supra note 3, at 123.  
 50 Tucker, supra note 48, at 530.  
 51 One commentator has gone so far as to argue that “the ability to direct corporate 
decisions represents the ability to control political life.” Michael R. Siebecker, A New 
Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 165 
(2010).     
 52 Ribstein, supra note 31.  
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achieve it.53 Both Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8 cannot satisfy this stringent 
standard because they share the same fatal flaw: the government interest 
both rules serve—equalizing the voices of incumbent and insurgent—is 
the same one the Citizens United majority rejected. 
B. The Insurmountable First Amendment Hurdle to Proxy Access Under 
Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8 
Citizens United repudiated any government interest in “equalizing the 
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of 
elections.”54 In the words of one commentator, the Court characterized 
“the inherent unequal playing field in any marketplace, especially the 
marketplace of ideas, as a reality of our economic and political 
system . . . beyond the reach of our government to remedy.”55 
The “equalization-of-voices” argument that the Court rejected in 
Citizens United, however, is an integral part of Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8.56 
Rule 14a-11 dramatically lowers the cost of an election contest, opening 
the corporate ballot to an insurgent group of shareholders who would 
otherwise lack the funds to oppose the company’s director nominees—
and the corporate policies they support.57 The rule not only alters the 
content of the proxy card, but also forces the company to publish, at its 
own expense, the competing views of the insurgents in the proxy 
statements.58 An equivalent rule in the political realm is laughable; 
indeed, “a drastic reordering of constitutional policy” would be necessary 
before an impartial government arbiter could compel, for instance, a 
Congresswoman running for reelection to allocate space in her campaign 
speeches to her opponent’s words.59 When contests for both political and 
corporate office ultimately affect social policy, however, government 
interference in the latter should similarly strike our sensibilities. 
In the same way, Rule 14a-8 levels the playing field between 
management and shareholders by compelling a corporation to carry at its 
own cost certain messages of dissident shareholders that it opposes. 
These shareholder proposals are not necessarily limited to commercial 
                                                                                                                       
 53 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).  
 54 Id. at 904.  
 55 Tucker, supra note 48, at 549. 
 56 Id.  
 57 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 58 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 59 WOLFSON, supra note 3, at 129. 
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issues, but may—and have—concerned purely political ones.60 Because 
the SEC does not permit corporations to exclude shareholder proposals in 
furtherance of “significant social policy” goals,61 corporate boards have 
propagated, in spite of themselves, political and social messages such as 
proposals to cease the sale of napalm because of its use in the Vietnam 
War62 and to end production of pâté de foie gras.63  
Compelling corporations to speak on these issues, however, is 
entirely inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s unwavering message that 
speech regarding matters of “public concern” is most deserving of First 
Amendment protection.64 As the Court recently explained, speech 
touches upon matters of public concern “when it can be fairly considered 
as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the 
community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a 
subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.”65 This 
definition clearly encompasses the content of shareholder proposals in 
furtherance of “significant social policy” goals. Because Rule 14a-8 
regulates the content of a corporation’s speech on matters of public 
concern, it is invalid under the First Amendment—and thus cannot serve 
as an alternative point of access to the corporate ballot. 
Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8 thus fall together, plagued by the same fatal 
flaw that characterized restrictions on corporate spending in political 
campaigns. Under Citizens United, the government cannot equalize 
political speech between contesting groups of unequal resources without 
running afoul of the First Amendment. Permitting the SEC to regulate the 
content of the corporate proxy is but another path to the same pernicious 
result.  
                                                                                                                       
 60 Justice Stevens has observed that Rule 14a-8 “cannot be justified on the basis of the 
commercial character of the communication, because the Rule can and has been used to 
propagate purely political proposals.” Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm., 475 
U.S. 1, 39 n.8 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 61 See Final Rule, supra note 17.  
 62 See Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1970), 
vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). 
 63 See Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 64 See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“[S]peech on public issues 
occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to 
special protection.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 65 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
76 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE [Vol. 73 
 
V. CONCLUSION: WINNING THE BATTLE AND THE WAR 
For business groups and other opponents of proxy access, vacating 
both Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8 on constitutional grounds would constitute 
an important victory, foreclosing the possibility of foisting shareholder 
nominees onto the corporate ballot. As the corporate ballot closes, 
however, a Pandora’s box of First Amendment challenges will open 
regarding a larger issue: the impact of Citizens United on the continued 
viability of the commercial speech doctrine.  
For those who have argued for years that there can be no principled 
distinction between commercial and political speech, extending First 
Amendment protection to proxy speech under Citizens United is but the 
first battle in a long war. It is the easiest fight to wage first because of all 
the corporate governance speech that the SEC regulates as commercial 
expression, proxy statements bear the greatest resemblance to 
conventional political speech. Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8 occupy adjacent 
battlefields, and one powerful weapon easily strikes them both down. 
Though the extent of the damage may now be unclear, the careful 
observer would do well to turn her gaze from the waves of corporate 
money flooding American elections to the steady dripping that could one 
day erode an established point of First Amendment jurisprudence. 
 
